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ABSTRACT 
 
Darrel Reynolds, executive vice president of Wenatchee Growers and grandson of its founder, had 
been approached by owners of another family-owned fruit company about a buyout.  If Darrel 
accepted their offer, Wenatchee would immediately expand from Washington state into California, 
becoming the largest producer of cherries in North America.  While this would greatly lengthen 
Wenatchee’s selling season, it would also mean new management and logistical challenges.  Darrel 
needed to decide if the acquisition makes sense, and if so, how much to pay for his closely-held 
target. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
enatchee Growers is named for its hometown, deep in Washington’s apple country, a place of 
mythological proportions, a lush land where fruit grows like nowhere else, America’s fruit bowl, a 
cornucopia of agricultural wealth. 
 
Every year, the region produces enough apples “to reach to the moon and halfway back.”1  But Washington grows 
more than apples, and so does Wenatchee Growers.  Over 60% of the apples, pears, and cherries that Washington state 
residents find in their produce departments come from Wenatchee Growers.  Cherries, in particular, are big business 
for the company, since cherries are three times as profitable as apples.  Cherries would be an even bigger business if 
Wenatchee acquired West Coast Fruit (WCF), the producer of 18% of the cherry crop from California. 
 
Wenatchee Growers is the largest shipper of fresh sweet cherries in North America.  West Coast Fruit, one of 
the largest cherry operations in California, has access to that state’s earliest-available cherries.  Together, they would 
guarantee their customers the availability of fresh cherries for longer than any other grower/shipper/marketer (“from 
shipping point to customer”) in North America.  Darrel Reynolds, the executive vice president of Wenatchee, had 
been pondering such an alliance since three of WCF’s five partners approached him in early 2003, asking to be bought 
out.  Valuing this offer was the first real challenge of Darrel’s management career.  He had only worked full-time in 
the family business for two years, since earning a business degree and becoming the first member of his family to 
graduate from college.  His sudden rise to a key position at Wenatchee stirred up some resentment among his family 
members, especially among those with extensive experience in the fruit industry.  Regardless, Darrel’s family had 
entrusted him with the fate of Wenatchee Growers, and he was the driving force behind the potential merger with 
West Coast Fruit Company.  He had to value the offer correctly. 
 
THE REYNOLDS FAMILY AND WENATCHEE GROWERS 
 
Wenatchee Growers was founded by Hank Reynolds, Darrel’s grandfather.  Hank started growing cherries in 
the late 1950s, but after earning only $89 his first year, he worried that growing fruit would not allow him to support 
his mother, wife, and three children.  During a trip to the buyers’ market, Hank discovered part of his problem: his 
cherries were being sold there in an acidic and dehydrated state.  "You have to realize that was a whole year's work for 
me," Hank said. "It really made me think. I wasn't about to give up or sell out, but I did start looking at new ways of 
doing things. I figured the only way to get good fruit to market was to pack and sell it myself." 
 
                                                 
1 All of these quotes are taken from Washington Apple Country, by Rick Steigmeyer and John Marshall (Graphic Arts Cebter 
Publishing Portland, OR, 1995. 
W 
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Hank wanted to find a new way to harvest, pack, and sell his cherries so that they would arrive to market in 
their original quality state.  Over the next three years, despite numerous difficulties and a tight budget, Hank was able 
to save enough money to purchase his own cherry-packing equipment and build a small warehouse— the initial inputs 
for Wenatchee Growers.  His business plan was simple: he would “pick in the morning and pack in the afternoon.”  
Better able to manage and control the quality of his crops, Hank finally sold his first box of cherries at the New York 
Growers Auction in 1962.  This was the beginning of a new era for Hank.  Now, more than three decades later, several 
of Hank’s sons and his grandson Darrel ran Hank’s company— the largest cherry shipper in North America.   
 
Much of Wenatchee Growers’ success could be attributed to intense quality control.  They aggressively 
invested their profits into research and development, and were an industry leader in responsible consumer packaging 
and environmental practices.  "We put whatever money is needed into the product, so that it will be the best in the 
world," said Darrel, "but we also put resources into finding a balance to keep things going for the next generation of 
Reynolds’."  Today, the company’s year-round “quality control” shipping policies benefit 350 Northwest growers, not 
to mention millions of consumers in the more than thirty countries that import their fruit.   
 
Wenatchee grew pears, apricots, cherries, and apples.  Every year, they produced roughly 6 million cases of 
apples and 2.5 million cases of cherries (about 30% of the state’s cherry crop); ten percent of this was organic.  
Cherries were three times more profitable than apples.  During the winter, the company employed 750 workers, but 
during the peak growing season it employed 2,000-3,000.  Wenatchee also had 250 affiliated, independent growers in 
Washington, California, New Zealand, and Chile, from whom they got 30-40% of the fruit they distributed.  The rest 
they grew themselves.  Wenatchee had 5,400 acres of its own orchard land, but had regional contracts translating into 
10,000 total “captive” acres.  This was a significant advantage for them: orchards are the critical fixed asset for cherry 
production, making entry into the market difficult.  Wenatchee sold its produce all over the world.  They had greatly 
benefited from the emergence of global trade, given their positioning as a free trader.  "More than 20 percent of our 
shipments went overseas last year," said Darrel.  "We have no problem with the idea of a global economy. It has really 
turned out to be a win for us in places like Mexico and the Pacific Rim."   
 
Who is West Coast Fruit? 
 
West Coast Fruit (WCF) was started in the 1920s by two brothers from Sicily, one of whom was now 82.  It 
had always been family-run.  It was currently structured as a general partnership, with 30% owned by the general 
partner, 30% by one limited partner, and the remaining 40% split equally among three other limited partners.  
Wenatchee was offered one of the 30% stakes and two of the smaller ones.  Management of the company had now 
passed to the third and fourth generation of the family, and Darrel says that “at generation three, the wheels fell off the 
tricycle.”  Hence the incentive for a buyout. 
 
WCF was a vertically integrated grower, packer, and marketer of fresh sweet cherries produced in the San 
Joaquin Valley of California.  They processed and marketed about 1 million cases every year, or about 18% of the 
fresh cherries grown in California.  They had earned a high level of respect and an excellent strategic position in the 
California cherry industry during their 75 years’ of cherry-packing experience.  West Coast Fruit’s business strategy 
was to deliver the earliest, highest-quality sweet cherries to the world premium markets, getting the highest prices and 
the highest returns for its growers.   
 
WCF had been a consistent leader in the introduction of new processing and handling methods.  They 
pioneered the pre-cooling, hydro-cooling, and water-flow transport processes that they used in their packing facility.  
These major innovations make WCF’s 320,000 square foot facility completely state-of-the-art, capable of packing 
40,000, 18-pound boxes of finished fruit per day and moving them from field to export in 72 hours.  As part of the 
buyout offer, Wenatchee could buy this facility for $6.5 million; Darrel estimated that it would cost $8 million to build 
it from scratch.  
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The Cherry Industry 
 
In 2003, on average, the United States produced more than 350 million tons of tart and sweet cherries (see 
Exhibits 1 and 2).  78,600 tons, the equivalent of 8,730,000 18-pound cases, comes from the Northwest.  The 
Northwest’s record for the most cherries produced in a single harvest season was 2001’s 97,000 tons.  The 2002 crop 
came up 3,600 tons short of the five-year average, at 75,000 tons.   (Wenatchee’s experience for this period mirrored 
that of the state as a whole: Wenatchee produced 22,000 tons in 2001 but only 16,000 in 2002.  Their revenues were 
unaffected, however, since the “shortage” led to higher prices.) 
 
 The biggest threat to the Washington cherry industry is eastern Washington’s cold weather, which often lasts 
through mid- to late April.  The cherry pollination process is inhibited by cold, wet, and windy weather.  (For 
example, in Michigan, spring frosts and poor pollination have been known to destroy up to 90% of the year’s cherry 
crops, leaving growers with little to no income.)  The threat of potential losses from severe weather is completely 
unpredictable.  
 
 Weather is just one of the challenges facing cherry growers.  (As Darrel said, “Producing cherries is like a 
medical triage center—it’s complete chaos.”)  Another is the basic fragility of the fruit.  For example, some cherries 
like the Rainier (which has a “notoriously temperamental personality”)2 must be picked “early in the morning before 
the fruit overheats and gets too soft to handle”; they then must be picked and packed by hand because they “show 
every bruise from rough handling” and would reach the consumer “look[ing] as sad as overripe bananas.”  Typically, 
cherries can survive up to four weeks if kept in a plastic bag (where the oxygen level is lower) at temperatures below 
32 degrees Fahrenheit.  Once the cold chain is broken, however, they can survive only a week at most.  The quality of 
distribution and storage is therefore crucial to extending the life of a cherry; the packaging methods must be state-of-
the-art.  Even in the best circumstances, though, velocity remains a more important strategic consideration than price. 
 
The cherry season varies by region, but is always short.  (In fact, many of the cherry varieties we see today 
were developed to ripen earlier or later than older varieties, so that the cherry-buying season could be extended.
3
)  For 
example, the California cherry season is from April 25 through the beginning of July, while the Washington cherry 
season begins in mid-June and continues through the end of August (see the chart on the next page).  Thus, California 
cherries ripen before Washington’s, and when the cherry season is ending in California, it is just beginning in 
Washington.  What this means for retailers is that they must clear the shelves after the California harvest and wait for 
the larger Washington harvest to come in.  This results in logistical challenges for growers, retailers, and consumers 
alike. 
 
 
Conventional Cherry Availability 
 
Key: = yellow = white = subacid yellow
2003
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dark-sweet
Washington
dark-sweet
Washington
Rainier
Washington
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Washington
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2 Quoted from “The Other Rainier,” by Stuart Eskenazi (Seattle Times, 6/27/04). 
3 ibid. 
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Strategic Considerations 
 
Darrel Reynolds believed the acquisition of West Coast Fruit would create new opportunities for the joint 
company.  He saw most of the value from this merger coming from the increase in demand that would accompany an 
extension of the fruit season, the opportunity to better market the crop in coordination with retailers, and the 
possibility of consolidating operating facilities.  
 
“Strategically this alliance creates a mirrored philosophy of extended cherry harvest from both locations,” 
said Darrel.  A newly allied Wenatchee/West Coast Fruit would be the first to market and the last out.  A seamless 
extension of the season would stimulate consumer demand.  As it is, retailers typically lost a full week of sales 
between the California and Washington seasons.  During this cherry hiatus, retailers must fill their empty cherry 
shelves with something else, only to clear the shelves again when the Washington cherries began to arrive.  
Consumers were never quite sure if they would find cherries in the store or not.  If Wenatchee/WCF could guarantee a 
constant supply of cherries throughout the summer, they could get to the retailers sooner and lock up their shelf space.  
In late June/early July—the period that Darrel called the “peak of product”—retailers usually dedicated about 10 feet 
of shelf space to cherries.  Until then, it was closer to 3 feet.  By increasing space at an earlier date, and by offering a 
higher volume of product, Wenatchee could generate a better velocity of sales.  Increasing velocity meant that 
consumers would have a better experience.  Quality, availability, and regularity would build consumer demand and 
generate incremental sales.  In Darrel’s words, “Sell-through and forced distribution will allow Wenatchee to hit the 
ground running, creating good velocity and good demand.”  He saw this as “a natural step in aligning growers with 
retailers in a go-to-market strategy to connect with the end consumer.” 
 
Wenatchee could capitalize on the increased demand to enhance its dealings with both small and large 
retailers.  Wenatchee would inherit the good relationships that West Coast Fruit had already established with the 
smaller retailers in its area.  It might also gain more clout with the larger retailers.  Larger growers had a higher 
likelihood of establishing partnerships with national grocery chains, since the chains were consolidating the number of 
growers from which they buy to facilitate coordination.  Being larger might also give Wenatchee more control over 
the way the stores handle and store the fruit. Given the fragility of the fruit, improper handling could easily mean bad 
experiences for customers.   
 
A combined Wenatchee/WCF wouldn’t just use its size to strong-arm retailers: it would also have something 
unique to offer.  The expansion of the cherry season meant the retailers could avoid changing displays from cherries to 
something else and then back again.  More product could mean more momentum and more sales.  Sales could be 
further increased since there would be new opportunities to advertise.  As it was, retailers were understandably 
reluctant to advertise cherries around the transition period between the California and Washington seasons, since they 
had to coordinate from growers in both states.  If Wenatchee/WCF could ensure that fruit will be available throughout 
the transition, retailers might be less “gun-shy” to go on ad during this period.  They might also be able to take 
advantage of advertising among regions.  Darrel said his strategic approach is partnering— coordinating 
merchandising and marketing with the retailers and creating relationships that allowed retailers to trust forecasted 
demand for Wenatchee’s product.  When that happened, Wenatchee could negotiate contractual pricing.  Darrel’s goal 
was to be “in bed” with the retailers, “going to market with the retailer to connect with the consumer.” 
 
In addition to improving relations with retailers and consumers, a merger with WCF might also offer 
Wenatchee the potential for operating consolidation.  Being able to provide product from multiple locations could 
diversify Wenatchee’s operating risks.  Were Wenatchee able to utilize West Coast’s advanced facility, it could put 
money used currently to maintain their operational facilities to other uses.  Taking advantage of these opportunities 
means logistical challenges, however.  It is a 15-hour, 931-mile drive from Wenatchee to West Coast’s facility in 
Stockton.  The price of transporting freight wass based on weight and mileage, with the standard load for a trailer of 
25,000 pounds.  According to an estimate from Artic Express, a transportation company specializing in refrigerated 
shipping, it would cost approximately $1,301.40 for a shipment between Stockton and Wenatchee, plus a gas 
surcharge of $132.55.  This did not include any sort of loading costs, and it assumed there would be no detention time 
(time the driver has to wait) at either facility or on the road. 
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Valuing West Coast Fruit 
 
Darrel was well aware of the numerous strategic advantages of a merger with West Coast Fruit.  But the 
impact of such a merger on his family’s company—and on his reputation within it—depended on correctly translating 
those advantages into dollars.  West Coast Fruit was a valuable company—but how valuable?  To help him find out, 
Darrel had collected financial information about both Wenatchee Growers and on West Coast Fruit.  This is presented 
in Exhibits 6 and 7, respectively.  For financing, Darrel planned to rely heavily on internal funds; he said Wenatchee 
had a very low debt/equity ratio, and he wanted to keep it that way.  Wenatchee’s corporate finance chief had 
suggested that they use a 15% discount rate to evaluate WCF, a rate which Darrel said incorporates a premium 
“because of the risk—wind, heat, rain, frost, fog, hail—of cherries.”  The rate of inflation for the food industry was 
1.4%, while the average rate for all items is at 3.2%.  The marginal personal and corporate tax rate was 37%.   Other 
macroeconomic data are presented in Exhibit 5.  
 
In the past, Wenatchee’s managers had made merger and buyout decisions based on EBITDA (for example, 
estimating a firm’s value as 4.5 times EBITDA).  Cash flow and ability to service debt were also critical.  Darrel’s 
response to this particular problem?  “We could have a conversation about that over 3 bottles of wine.”   
 
Darrel was convinced that a merger with West Coast would be profitable for Wenatchee.  However, to give 
him some flexibility in case his analyses suggest otherwise, he negotiated a one-month option to opt out of the deal.  
Exercising this option would cost Wenatchee $2 million.   
 
Is a merger with West Coast Fruit a good idea for Wenatchee Growers?  If so, how much should Darrel pay 
for 51% of West Coast’s equity? 
 
 
APPENDIX  
 
Exhibit 1: Cherry Production 
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Exhibit 2: Consumption And Exports 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3: Prices 
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Exhibit 4: Types Of Cherries 
 
 
 
Brooks The Brooks is a very large, firm, and well colored fruit. 
Tulares A large, brighter red, heart shaped fruit. 
Garnets A cherry that is large, sweet and brighter red. 
Bings 
Most popular variety in the United States. Later in CA, large and firm, 
with a dark skin and flesh.  
 
 
Brooks The Brooks is a very large, firm, and well colored fruit. 
Chelans Skin and flesh are mahogany in color and the cherry is very large and 
firm. Its taste is sweet and tart. 
Bings Most popular variety in the United States. Early in WA, large and firm, 
with a dark skin and flesh.  
Rainiers Golden yellow cherry with pink/red blush. Recognized for being sweet, 
plump, juicy and intense flavor. 
Lamberts This late variety becomes available two weeks after the Bing. Large and 
very dark in color. 
Lapins Very large, firm and dark late season cherry similar to sweetheart. 
Sonatas Dark red, heart-shaped. Larger than the Bing with a rich, full-bodied 
flavor. 
Hill Bings Same as other Bings. Later due to elevation.  
Hill Lamberts Same as other Lamberts. Later due to elevation.  
     Source:  company 
 
 
Exhibit 5: Macroeconomic Data 
 
   Prime Rate:      Rate  Effective Date  
   The base rate on corporate loans posted by at least 75% of the 
nation's 30 largest banks. 
 
 
 
    4.00 %  06/27/02 
    
 
 
 
   Discount Rate:      Rate  Effective Date  
   The charge on loans to depository institutions by the Federal 
Reserve Banks. 
 
 
 
    2.00 %  06/25/02 
      
 
 
 
   Federal Funds:      Rate     
   Reserves traded among commercial banks for overnight use in 
amounts of $1 million or more. FOMC target rate effective 06/25/02. 
 
 
 
    1.0000 %  FOMC target rate 
    1.0313 %  High 
    1.0000 %  Low 
    1.0000 %  Near Closing Bid 
    1.0313 %  Offered 
 
 
 
Journal of Business Case Studies – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 3, Number 2 
 70 
Treasury Yield Curve, December 2002  
 
date 1-mo. 3-mo. 6-mo. 1-yr. 2-yr. 3-yr. 5-yr. 7-yr. 10-yr. 20-yr.
12/27/2002 1.07 1.16 1.23 1.36 1.60 1.97 2.79 3.36 3.83 4.83
12/30/2002 1.15 1.22 1.24 1.36 1.61 1.95 2.76 3.34 3.82 4.82
12/31/2002 1.20 1.22 1.23 1.32 1.61 1.99 2.78 3.36 3.83 4.83  
 
 
Source: Wall Street Journal
Yield Curve: December 2002
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
1-mo 3-mo 6-mo 1-yr 2-yr 3-yr 5-yr 7-yr 10-yr 20-yr
Maturity
Y
ie
ld
 (
%
)
Average Yield (%)
Journal of Business Case Studies – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 3, Number 2 
 71 
Exhibit 6: Wenatchee Growers Financial Data 
 
Wenatchee Growers 
Balance Sheet 
 December 31,  December 31, 
Assets 2002 2001 Liab & Shareholders' Equity 2002 2001 
Current Assets   Current Liabilities   
Cash and Cash Equivalents 5,814,753 496,979 Accounts Payable   
Accounts Receivable   Trade 5,836,069 6,401,571 
Trade 19,166,768 17,445,173 Undistributed fruit proceeds 12,845,297 3,099,663 
Growers 2,444,028 2,608,483 Growers 4,622,933 5,305,794 
Other  647,331 557,931 Related Parties 60,185 37,639 
Related parties, curr port 3,754,930 5,375,573 Other 6,883 627,819 
Packing supplies inventory 2,264,639 1,999,198 Accrued expenses 1,170,760 1,231,653 
Fruit inventory 383,221 2,929,565 Line of Credit 0 4,500,000 
Prepaid expenses 878,048 293,724 Crop Loans 182,731 344,922 
Total current assets 35,353,718 31,706,626 Current portion of LT debt and    
   obligations under capital leases 5,424,123 6,261,833 
Land, Building, & Equipment  Total current liabilities 30,148,981 27,810,894 
Land and improvements 6,687,767 5,426,727    
Buildings 48,640,924 47,115,100 LT Debt and Oblig   
Machinery, equip, & furnit 63,067,215 51,956,839 Under Capital Leases, net of  37,642,014 33,448,834 
Orchard development 2,874,875 2,781,939 current portion   
 121,270,781 107,280,605    
Less accumulated deprec 51,221,872 45,066,357 Subordinated Debt 4,033,658 4,033,658 
 70,048,909 62,214,248    
Construction in progress 1,180,399 2,684,352 Deferred Compensation 123,462 120,011 
 71,229,308 64,898,600    
Related-Party Receivables   Minority Interests 444,901 511,501 
net of current portion 4,255,968 3,004,547    
   Stockholders' Equity   
Other Assets   Common stock, $100 par, 750 70,000 70,000 
Investments 555,907 97,277 shares authorized, 700 shares    
Grower rec, net of curr port 610,403  issued and outstanding   
Other Assets 605,932 712,096 Additional paid-in capital 625,307 625,307 
 1,772,242 809,373 Accumulated other comprehensive -698,359 -507,900 
   loss   
 112,611,236 100,419,146 Retained earnings 40,221,272 34,306,841 
    40,218,220 34,494,248 
      
    112,611,236 100,419,146 
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Exhibit 6: Continued 
 
Wenatchee Growers, Inc.       
Consolidated Statement of Income      
  December 31, 2002    
Packing & Warehouse Revenue  71,294,671    
Cost of Packing & Warehouse  54,473,857    
Gross Profit  16,820,814    
Selling, General, & Administrative  8,516,529    
Income from Operations  8,304,285    
Other Income       
Interest income  501,040    
Interest expense  -3,191,991    
Other income, net  481,865    
  -2,209,086    
Income before Minority Interest  6,095,199    
Minority Interest in Subsidiary Income  -180,768    
Net Income  5,914,431    
 
      
Wenatchee Growers, Inc.  December 31, 2002    
Consolidated Statement of Changes    Accumulated   
in Stockholders' Equity   Other   
 Common  Additional Paid-in Comprehensive Retained  
 Stock Capital Income Earnings Total 
Balance, December 31, 2001 70,000 625,307 -507,900 34,306,841 34,494,248 
      
Comprehensive Income      
Other comprehensive income      
Unrealized loss on interest rate swap   -190,459  -190,459 
Net Income    5,914,431 5,914,431 
Total comprehensive income     -190,459 5,914,431 5,723,972 
      
Balance, December 31, 2002 70,000 625,307 -698,359 40,221,272 40,218,220 
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Exhibit 6: Continued 
 
Wenatchee Growers, Inc.   
Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows  
Year Ended December 31, 2002   
     
Net Cash from Operating Activities   
Net Income    5,914,431 
Adjustments to reconcile net income    
to net cash from operating activities   
Depreciation & Amortization  6,071,178 
Minority Interest in subsidiary income  180,768 
Income from investments  -258,524 
Allowance from doubtful accounts  298,565 
Increase (decrease) in cash due to    
changes in assets and liabilities   
 Accounts receivable  -1,910,995 
 Inventory   2,280,903 
 Prepaid Expenses  -454,341 
 Grower Receivable  -844,619 
 Other Assets  90,658 
 Accounts payable  7,898,881 
 Accrued expenses  -61,591 
 Accrued interest  698 
 Deferred compensation  3,451 
Net Cash from Operations  19,209,463 
     
Cash Flows from Investing Activities   
Loans issuance costs   -30,140 
Purchases of land, buildings, and equip  -4,452,973 
Net repayments on related-party receivables 369,222 
 Net Cash from investing activities -4,113,891 
     
Cash Flows from Financing Activities   
Proceeds from crop loans  997,835 
Payments made on crop loans  -1,160,026 
Net payments made on line-of-credit facility -4,500,000 
Payments made on long-term debt  -15,482,141 
Additional borrowings on long-term debt  10,613,902 
Capital distributions to LLC member  -247,368 
 Net Cash from financing activities -9,777,798 
     
Net Increase in Cash and Cash Equivalents 5,317,774 
     
Cash and Cash Equivalents, December 31, 2001 496,979 
     
Cash and Cash Equivalents, December 31, 2002 5,814,753 
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Exhibit 6: Completed 
 
Supplemental disclosure of cash flows information: 
 
 Interest received in cash during the year    $501,040 
 Interest paid in cash during the year    3,275,193 
 
Schedule of noncash investing and financing activities: 
 
 During the year ended December 31, 2002, the Company had an unrealized loss on interest rate swaps of 
$190,459.  The effect of this is an increase in long-term debt of $190,459 and a decrease in other 
comprehensive income of $190,459. 
 As of December 31, 2002 and 2001, the Company had capitalized, as prepaid expenses, $432,033 and 
$302,647, respectively, of depreciation expense associated with cherry packing equipment. 
 During the year ended December 31, 2002, the Company exchanged $200,106 of grower receivable balances 
into ownership of two orchard investments. 
 During the year ended December 31, 2002, the Company entered into fixed asset capital leases for 
$8,033,250. 
 
Exhibit 7: West Coast Fruit Financial Data 
 
 
PER UNIT SUMMARY (Data Provided By WCF’s Accountant): 
BOX POUNDS
variable income $14.06 $0.59 $12,104,697
fixed income 0.00 0.00 $2,537
total income 14.06 0.59 $12,107,234
variable labor 3.69 0.16 $3,180,399
variable operating costs 4.21 0.18 $3,621,102
total VC 7.90 0.34 $6,801,501
fixed labor 0.84 0.04 $726,844
interest cost 0.39 0.02 $331,607
fixed costs 3.33 0.14 $2,868,452
total FC 4.56 0.20 $3,926,903
total costs 12.46 0.54 $10,728,404
net income 1.60 0.05 $1,378,830
contribution margin 6.16 0.26
break even 637,058 15,072,914  
 
 
Additional Information: 
 
1. West Coast Fruit (WCF) uses a line of credit to meet its seasonal working capital needs.  It may borrow up to 
a total of $5,000,000 between January and August.  The minimum initial draw is $300,000.  Interest is paid at 
the end of the month on the balance outstanding at the beginning of the month, at a stated rate of 4.5%.  
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When the firm generates available cash flow, it is first applied to any outstanding balance from this line.  All 
borrowings must be repaid by October 1.      
2. Cherry production projections for WCF: 
 
3. Most of WCF’s sales are made on account, charged and paid during the harvest cycle (April through July).  
There are also approximately $3.5 million in cash sales during these months, made in proportion to the 
number of boxes produced. 
4. Between April and July, WCF makes cash payments to its growers of approximately $3 million.  These are 
also made in proportion to production. 
5.  WCF’s fixed administrative payroll is $28,730.  In January and August, inventory, maintenance, and 
accounting statement preparation cause this portion of payroll to 4 and 5 times normal, respectively.  
February and March also require extra labor inputs, as WCF gears up for harvest.  Total administrative 
payroll is 1.5 times normal in these two months. 
6. Variable labor charges for harvest labor is determined as $3.69/box produced. 
7. WCF’s bookkeeper has prepared some basic pro-forma monthly balance sheets for 2003.  These are shown 
on the next page.  However, he did not adjust the current liabilities to reflect payments of the current portion 
of long-term debt; changes in total current liabilities reflect only payments on trade accounts payable.  
Required debt payments are shown in the table below.    
8. WCF leases certain portions of CJL Orchards.  The lease calls for varying monthly payments, corresponding 
to the harvest cycle.  Required payments are listed in the table below. 
 
REQUIRED
PAYMENTS ON ORCHARD
MONTH LONG-TERM DEBT PAYMENTS
JAN $58,177 $219,244
FEB $51,358 $30,000
MAR $44,400 $30,000
APR $51,611 $60,000
MAY $44,500 $100,000
JUN $44,500 $100,000
JUL $51,867 $100,000
AUG $44,600 $30,000
SEP $44,700 $30,000
OCT $64,285 $30,000
NOV $45,100 $30,000
DEC $44,800 $30,000  
 
 
9. Rent for WCF’s office space is $55,000/month. 
10. WCF’s owners’ capital draws total $33,000/month. 
11. WCF’s long-term debt carries a stated rate of 6%. 
 
 
MONTH # of boxes
APRIL 42,377
MAY 450,950
JUN 403,399
JULY 8,327
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APPENDIX 
  
Summary 
 Wenatchee Growers, a third-generation family firm based in Wenatchee, Washington, was considering the acquisition of 
West Coast Fruit Company (WCF) of California.  Three of the five family members who control WCF were ready to divest 
themselves of their shares, and had approached the managers of Wenatchee with an offer to buy 51% of WCF’s equity.  The 
challenge for Wenatchee (and the students) was to determine the value of that equity stake. 
 
Target Courses/Intended Audience 
 
 This case was partially written by students in a senior-level advanced corporate finance course, and was designed to be 
used in future sections of that course.  The case addresses many of the salient issues of corporate finance, including estimating the 
opportunity cost of capital and the required return on equity; adjusting betas and/or discount rates for varying capital structures; 
deciphering financial statements and using ratio analysis; projecting project cash flows; and estimating the benefits of a merger.  
However, the significant strategic elements of the case make it equally appropriate for a capstone strategy course. 
 
Suggested Questions 
 
1. How should Wenatchee evaluate the potential acquisition of WCF? 
2. How should Wenatchee determine the appropriate discount rate to use to value WCF’s cash flows? 
3. What is the value of WCF as a stand-alone business?  How should this value affect Wenatchee’s assessment of the potential 
acquisition? 
4. What is the value of Wenatchee Growers as a stand-alone business? 
5. What are the significant strategic elements that Wenatchee must consider when evaluating the potential acquisition? 
6. How much should Wenatchee pay for 51% of WCF’s equity? 
 
EPILOGUE 
Wenatchee did buy West Coast Fruit, for about $10 million.  Wenatchee’s finance chief had valued the WCF at between 
$10-$12 million, using the discount rate of 15% and an average annual cash flow of about $2.25 million.  In 2003, cherry sales 
were up in the market as a whole by almost 40%. 
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NOTE:  This case is based on real events.  The financial statements and other information presented are based on the actual 
numbers used by the participants (although some scaling may have been applied and other adjustments may have been made for 
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case was written by students in an advanced corporate finance course at the University of Puget Sound.  
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Exhibit 7: (Continued) 
 
 
Dec-02 Jan-03 Feb-03 Mar-03 Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03
ASSETS
total cash $90,508 $102,595 $0 $0 $0 $0 $4,618,618
A/R fruit sales $95,651 $251,386 $88,788 $1,236 $738,336 $8,641,128 $7,895,543
total other A/R $1,223,121 $1,224,181 $1,224,181 $1,224,181 $1,224,181 $1,224,181 $1,224,181
total other current assets $756,039 $756,039 $756,039 $756,039 $756,039 $756,039 $756,039
total PP&E $5,817,769 $6,003,563 $5,999,163 $5,994,763 $6,020,363 $6,085,963 $6,151,563
total loans receivable $240,945 $773,364 $973,364 $973,364 $973,364 $973,364 $973,364
TOTAL ASSETS $8,224,033 $9,111,128 $9,041,535 $8,949,583 $9,712,283 $17,680,675 $21,619,308
LIABILITIES
total current liabilities $989,491 $1,792,545 $2,032,163 $2,365,759 $3,236,374 $8,363,797 $10,647,768
total long-term debt $2,812,555 $2,754,438 $2,703,080 $2,658,680 $2,607,069 $2,562,569 $2,518,069
total liabilities $3,806,200 $4,251,779 $4,646,682 $5,124,439 $5,586,756 $5,053,022 $4,489,494
total stockholders' equity $4,417,833 $4,859,349 $4,394,853 $3,825,144 $4,125,527 $12,627,653 $17,129,814
TOTAL L&OE $8,224,033 $9,111,128 $9,041,535 $8,949,583 $9,712,283 $17,680,675 $21,619,308
WEST COAST FRUIT
Pro-Forma Balance Sheets: 2003
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Exhibit 7: (concluded) 
 
Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03
ASSETS
total cash $8,833,204 $1,250,381 $1,162,922 $842,177 $576,897 $309,132
A/R fruit sales $1,699,983 $340,985 $1,236 $1,236 $1,236 $1,236
total other A/R $1,224,181 $1,224,181 $1,224,181 $1,224,181 $1,224,181 $1,224,181
total other current assets $756,039 $756,039 $756,039 $756,039 $756,039 $756,039
total PP&E $6,217,163 $6,212,763 $6,208,363 $6,203,963 $6,199,563 $6,195,163
total loans receivable $973,364 $973,364 $973,364 $973,364 $973,364 $973,364
TOTAL ASSETS $19,703,934 $10,757,713 $10,326,105 $10,000,960 $9,731,280 $9,459,115
LIABILITIES
total current liabilities $9,913,292 $1,360,557 $1,217,899 $1,160,634 $1,140,388 $1,141,726
total long-term debt $2,466,202 $2,421,602 $2,376,902 $2,312,617 $2,267,517 $2,222,717
total liabilities $4,203,151 $3,782,159 $3,594,801 $3,473,251 $3,407,905 $3,364,443
total stockholders' equity $15,500,783 $6,975,554 $6,731,304 $6,527,709 $6,323,375 $6,094,672
TOTAL L&OE $19,703,934 $10,757,713 $10,326,105 $10,000,960 $9,731,280 $9,459,115
WEST COAST FRUIT
Pro-Forma Balance Sheets: 2003
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